Track: Systems

What:
Talk
Part of:
When:
9:30 AM, Wednesday 15 Jul 2020 EDT (1 hour 15 minutes)
Discussion:
1

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Session Chair: Cristina Onete


  • Protecting the 4G and 5G Cellular Paging Protocols against Security and Privacy Attacks

    Ankush Singla (Purdue University), Syed Rafiul Hussain (Purdue University), Omar Chowdhury (University of Iowa), Elisa Bertino (Purdue University), and Ninghui Li (Purdue University)

    Pre-recorded presentation

    SummaryThis paper focuses on protecting the cellular paging protocol --- which balances between the quality-of-service and battery consumption of a device --- against security and privacy attacks. Attacks against this protocol can have severe repercussions, for instance, allowing attacker to infer a victim's location, leak a victim's IMSI, and inject fabricated emergency alerts. To secure the protocol, we first identify the underlying design weaknesses enabling such attacks and then propose efficient and backward-compatible approaches to address these weaknesses. We also demonstrate the deployment feasibility of our enhanced paging protocol by implementing it on an open-source cellular protocol library and commodity hardware. Our evaluation demonstrates that the enhanced protocol can thwart attacks without incurring substantial overhead.


  • Enhanced Performance and Privacy for TLS over TCP Fast Open

    Erik Sy (University of Hamburg), Tobias Mueller (University of Hamburg), Christian Burkert (University of Hamburg), Hannes Federrath (University of Hamburg), and Mathias Fischer (University of Hamburg)

    Pre-recorded presentation

    SummarySmall TCP flows make up the majority of web flows. For them, the TCP three-way handshake induces significant delay overhead. The TCP Fast Open (TFO) protocol can significantly decrease this delay via zero round-trip time (0-RTT) handshakes for all TCP hand- shakes that follow a full initial handshake to the same host. However, this comes at the cost of privacy limita- tions and also has some performance limitations. In this paper, we investigate the TFP deployment on popular websites and browsers. We found that a client revisiting a web site for the first time fails to use an abbreviated TFO handshake in 40% of all cases due to web server load-balancing using multiple IP addresses. Our analysis further reveals significant privacy problems of the protocol design and implementation. Network-based attackers and online trackers can exploit TFO to track the online activities of users. As a countermeasure, we introduce a novel protocol called TCP Fast Open Privacy (FOP). TCP FOP prevents tracking by network attackers and impedes third-party tracking, while still allowing 0-RTT handshakes as in TFO. As a proof-of-concept, we have implemented the proposed protocol for the Linux kernel and a TLS library. Our measurements indicate that TCP FOP outperforms TLS over TFO when websites are served from multiple IP addresses.


  • INFUSE: Invisible plausibly-deniable file system for NAND flash

    Chen Chen (Stony Brook University), Anrin Chakraborti (Stony Brook University), and Radu Sion (Stony Brook University)

    Pre-recorded presentation

    SummaryProtecting sensitive data stored on local storage devices e.g., laptops, tablets etc. is essential for privacy. When adversaries are powerful enough to coerce users to reveal encryption keys/passwords, encryption alone becomes insufficient for data protection. Additional mechanisms are required to hide the very presence of sensitive data. Plausibly deniable storage systems (PDS) are designed to defend against such powerful adversaries. Plausible deniability allows a user to deny the existence of certain stored data even when an adversary has access to the storage medium. However, existing plausible deniability solutions leave users at the mercy of adversaries suspicious of their very use. Indeed, it may be difficult to justify the use of a plausible deniability system while claiming that no sensitive data is being hidden. This work introduces INFUSE, a plausibly-deniable file system that hides not only contents but also the evidence that a particular system is being used to hide data. INFUSE is “invisible” (identical layout with standard file system), provides redundancy, handles overwrites, survives data loss, and is secure in the presence of multi-snapshot adversaries. INFUSE is efficient. Public data operations are orders of magnitude faster than existing multi-snapshot resilient PD systems, and only 15% slower than a standard non-PD baseline, and hidden data operations perform comparably to existing systems.

Who's Attending 

  • 11 anonymous people